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Abstract 
Existing literature shows that mega-M&A deals valued over $500mil end up destroying the 
shareholder value of acquirers on a significant scale. Our paper considers mega-deal as a 
dependent event and examines the role of acquirer’s previous acquisition experience playing 
in the outcome of mega-deals. We find that mega-deals conducted by firms with a high level 
of acquisition experience, i.e. a firm completed at least 12 transactions before, are more likely 
to be completed. In addition, more experienced acquirer of mega-deals generate positive 
abnormal stock returns for shareholders in both short-run and long-run, with a dollar value 
gain of $50.6 million around deal announcement. We also find that more experienced 
acquirers are better at managing the post-acquisition integration process and enjoy a 
significant improvement in operating performance. 
Keywords: Mergers and Acquisitions, Mega-Deals, Acquisition Experience, and Value 
Creation 
JEL Classification: G14, G34 
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1. Introduction 
It has been well documented that acquirers tend to destroy shareholders’ wealth in mergers 
and acquisitions (M&As),1 in large deals with transaction value especially, in excess of $500 
million (henceforth “mega-deals”).2 Several explanations have been provided in the literature, 
including the overpayment hypothesis (Loderer and Martin, 1990), the hubris hypothesis 
(Roll, 1986), the empire building hypothesis (Grinstein and Hribar, 2004), and the integration 
complexity hypothesis (Alexandridis et al., 2013). However, Alexandridis et al. (2017) 
document a recent change to this phenomenon and find that mega-mergers have generated 
more value for acquirer shareholders since 2009. There are a growing number of mega-deals. 
In 2015, mega-deals reached an all-time record for the U.S. market. There were 547 
announced mega transactions with a total value of over $2 trillion, which accounted for 
approximately 85% of overall U.S. M&As value and 10% of U.S. GDP that year, according 
to Thomson Reuters data.    
With such large deal value, mega-deals play a significant role in firms’ operation, generally 
receive widespread publicity and are under more investor scrutiny and corporate governance 
(Alexandridis et al., 2017). Specifically, mega-deals are usually undertaken as a strategic 
move by those largest and most successful firms who expect to accumulate more revenues 
beyond the established patterns (Davidson, 1987). For example, from the deals of IBM-Lotus, 
ExxonMobil-XTO, and more recently Facebook-WhatsApp, acquirers have used target firms 
as a springboard into a new market and to obtain the augmentation of business ranges. 
Besides the influence on the firm itself, following a mega acquisition the industry will be 
reshaped in terms of competition. Given the fact that mega-mergers continue at a rapid pace 
and play an important role, the limited evidence concerning their value creation calls for 
more investigations.  
Another important consideration regarding mega-deals is the deal completion, but most 
studies only focus on the valuation effect of transaction. Unlike small deals, mega-deals tend 
to draw more antitrust scrutiny and are expected to cope with more regulation issues, which 
greatly challenge acquirers to choose the right target and the right time. Also, as a strategic 
                                                          
1 A survey by Betton et al. (2008) shows that bidders on average experience negative abnormal returns in most 
of the acquirer returns studies.  
2 For example, Moeller et al. (2004) document a negative relation between acquirer size and shareholder gains. 
Alexandridis et al. (2017) summarize considerable research suggesting that sizeable takeover ends up costing 
shareholders on a significant scale, including Cools et al. (2007), Henry and Jespersen (2002), Rehm et al. 
(2012), Saigol (2015), and Alexandridis et al. (2013). 
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move with significant influence, a mega-deal requires large amounts of resources and is 
prepared over a long time and with great effort. If the transaction fails to complete, acquirers 
may be required to pay a huge amount of breakup fee to compensate the cost incurred by the 
target.3 In the AT&T-T-Mobile case, T-Mobile was paid $3 billion in cash as well as $1 
billion in wireless assets after AT&T ditched the $39 billion transaction. In addition to large 
failure costs, the previous literature also documents that acquirers of failed M&As 
underperform those whose deal was successful, and continue to suffer following the deal 
announcement (Masulis et al., 2012; Savor and Lu, 2009). 
Previous research findings that large deals destroy value consider each mega-deal as an 
independent event. However, mega transactions are conducted with considerable difficulty by 
first time bidders due to a high degree of uncertainty and the complexities of integration. 
Consulting firms, e.g. Boston Consulting Group and Bain & Company, have suggested that 
instead of directly engaging in mega-deals, top acquirers first hone skill through smaller deals. 
With more experience, acquirers are capable of mitigating the risk of failure and creating 
synergies as they are more skilful at transforming the deal’s complexity into value 
(Kengelbach and Roos, 2011). Based on this view, this paper investigates whether mega-
deals conducted by an experienced acquirer will have a greater likelihood of completion and 
generate more wealth for acquirer shareholders. 
Our study employs a data set of 3,544 U.S. mergers and acquisitions priced over $500 million 
(2016 dollars), with the announcement date between 1980 and 2016. Following Zollo and 
Singh (2004), we measure acquisition experience with the total number of mergers and 
acquisitions that a sample acquirer completed before the mega-deal of interest.4 Our main 
findings show that mega-deals carried by a more experienced acquirer are more likely to be 
successful. The existence of a more experienced acquirer significantly increases the 
likelihood of mega-deal success by 3.57%. In addition, it is worth noting that mega-deals 
conducted by more experienced acquirers generate value for acquiring shareholders in the 
short-run, and this result only holds in the successful sample. Specifically, the median 
cumulative abnormal return for a more experienced acquirer is 0.14% in successful mega-
deals during the three-day window around the deal announcement, corresponding to a value 
                                                          
3 According to the reports by Practical Law Corporate & Securities (2016), the average fee paid by acquirers is 
around 5% of the deal value. 
4 As Hayward (2002) suggests that experience gained long while ago might be unavailable, we also measure 
acquirer experience by using the sum of mergers and acquisitions that a sample firm made during the 10 years 
before the announcement of mega-deal and the results still hold. 
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creation of $19.39 million or 1.5 cents per dollar spent. In terms of inexperienced acquirers in 
the successful sample, the median cumulative abnormal announcement return is -0.25%, with 
a loss of $4.71 million or 0.44 cents per dollar spent. Compared to successful mega-deals 
across the sample, although failed deals earn lower abnormal returns, the difference is not 
significant. This suggests that as of the deal announcement the successful and the failed deals 
cannot be clearly distinguished by the market.  
Our long-run analysis suggests that mega-deals made by more experienced bidders have a 
better stock performance and a greater improvement in operating performance for a 3-year 
horizon following the deal announcement. This positive relation is only significant in the 
successful sample. Specifically, our results show that mega-deals completed by more 
experienced acquirers is subject to an excess 36-month stock return of 21.65% and ROA 
increase of 2.76% from -3 to +3 year relative to the deal announcement. The findings of the 
successful sample can be explained by considering that more experienced bidders excel at the 
integration process, e.g. cultural-alignment and goal-setting, and therefore helps mega-deals 
deliver a better performance, which is consistent with the view of consulting firms 
(Kengelbach and Roos, 2011).  
By comparing the long-run stock performance of successful mega-deals with failed ones in 
the univariate analysis, an important finding is that failed acquirers continually underperform 
successful acquirers. However, this result only applies to inexperienced acquirer and there is 
no systematic difference between successful and failed deals made by more experienced 
acquirer. The buy and hold abnormal returns for inexperienced acquirers in the failed sample 
becomes gradually worse and drops from -10.72% in the 12-months window to -22.26% in 
the 36-months window following the deal announcement. This suggests that although mega-
deals completed by inexperienced acquirers destroy value for shareholders, their failed 
counterparts do much worse.  
Our paper contributes to the literature on the wealth effects of mega-deals. While the existing 
literature treat all mega deals as independent events and find on average mega deals destroy 
value for acquirers, we consider them as strategic and sequential decisions by the acquirers, 
and find that experienced acquirers can create, but not destroy, value for acquirer 
shareholders, in the form of higher completion rate and higher wealth effects of deal 
announcements. 
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Our paper also contributes to the organizational learning literature, and highlight the 
importance of past firm’s M&A experiences on the M&A performance and imply that the 
cost of learning during the early-stage of the M&A experiences may be repaid back at later 
stage. This new evidence has broad implications to policy makers, practitioners and other 
stakeholders of firm M&A. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the hypotheses 
development. Section 3 describes our sample. We start our formal analysis in Section 4, 
where the empirical results are reported and analysed. Section 5 conducts robustness checks. 
We conclude in Section 6. 
 
2. Hypothesis development 
Studies focused on the success of mega-deals mostly investigate the stock performance 
following a deal announcement. However, we argue that more attention to the completion of 
a mega-deal is also required. Compared to small deals, mega-deals with a larger transaction 
deal value which requires much more preparations during the pre-acquisition period and 
therefore could takes more time and effort. The time to resolution is around 120 days for 
mega-deals, while it only takes about 70 days for non-mega-deals (Alexandridis et al., 2017). 
For example, Pfizer and Allergan merger, the largest pharmaceuticals deal in history, was 
advised by six investment banks and the time the two firms spent working on the deal is 135 
days, and the withdrawn decision made all the efforts in vain. In addition, acquirers are on 
average subject to a termination fee which is around 5% of the transaction value (Practical 
Law Corporate & Securities, 2016). In the case of mega-deals, the break-up fee can be huge. 
Luo (2005) also suggests that a firm’s reputation and credibility can be severely damaged by 
withdrawing from an announced deal. This damage would be great in the case of mega-deals 
as they generally receive more publicity i.e. media coverage.   
To examine the completion of mega-deals, we follow organizational learning literature on 
M&As suggesting that acquirers can learn from previous acquisition experience (Barkema 
and Schijven, 2008; Lei et al., 1996; Levitt and March, 1988). With the complexity related to 
mega-deals, this paper argues that acquirers’ experience plays a significant role in both the 
pre-acquisition negotiation and decision-making process. As Dikova et al. (2010) point out, 
more experience would help acquiring firms efficiently communicate with stockholders, 
employ the right integration strategy, implement an announcement plan, and meet the 
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requirements set out by antitrust policy. Therefore, in the context of mega-deals, we would 
expect that: 
H1: Mega-deals conducted by more experienced acquirers will have a higher likelihood to 
successfully complete.  
In terms of deal performance, it is largely suggested by consulting firms that large deals made 
by experienced acquirers who have developed skills through small deals are more likely to 
realize synergies and achieve better performance (Kengelbach and Roos, 2011). However, the 
empirical evidence concerning the role that acquisition experience plays in M&As is mixed. 
On the one hand, the organizational learning hypothesis predicts that the ability to generate 
shareholder value increases with the number of merger deals done before (Hayward, 2002; 
Levitt and March, 1988). On the other hand, the advantage of learning will be cancelled if a 
more experienced acquirer becomes overconfident, leading to a worse deal performance 
(Billett and Qian, 2008).   
We expect to find that acquirers’ previous experience has a positive influence on mega-deals 
performance. Two reasons have been put forward, suggesting that acquirers in mega-mergers 
tend to be more cautious rather than overconfident. First, as a crucial strategic move 
involving a huge amount of money, mega-deals could have significant influence on firms’ 
future operations and CEOs’ future careers. Second, there would be more public attention 
given to mega-deals, and therefore acquirers face stricter investor and corporate governance. 
Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Mega-deals conducted by more experienced acquirers will create more value for 
acquirer’s shareholders.  
 
3. Data and methodology 
3.1 Sample selection Criteria 
The sample of mergers and acquisitions includes completed and failed U.S. mergers and 
acquisitions between January 1980 and December 2016, from the Thomson Financial SDC 
database. We apply the following filters that are common in the literature: (1) the acquirer is 
a U.S. publicly traded company and the target is a public, private or subsidiary firm; (2) the 
transaction value is an inflation adjusted value of at least $500 million in 2016 dollar terms 
and exceeds 1% of the acquiring firm’s market value of equity 11 days before the 
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announcement;5 (3) the acquirer owns less than 10% of the target’s shares prior to the deal 
announcement and more than 50% after the deal; (4) the acquirer has stock price data and 
accounting data available on Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, 
respectively; (5) the acquirer is not from the financial industry (SIC code 6000-6999) nor the 
utilities industry (SIC code 4900-4949) as these two industries have unique regulatory 
requirements. These restrictions result in a final sample of 3,544 M&A deals.   
3.2 Measure of acquisition experience 
Following Zollo and Singh (2004), acquisition experience is measured as the total number of 
acquisitions that a sample acquiring firm completed before the mega-deal of interest. The 
data is obtained from Thomson SDC, and therefore it is available back to the 1980s. Then we 
divide the mega-deals sample into three groups based on acquisition experience: mega-deals 
conducted by acquirers with high experience (the top 25%), with moderate experience (the 
middle 50%), and with low experience (the bottom 25%). We also construct a dummy 
variable High Experience Dummy, equalling one if a mega-deal is carried out by an acquirer 
with high experience, and zero otherwise. Within our sample, 857 of mega-deals with more 
experienced acquirers have completed more than 12 deals before, 1476 with moderate 
experience acquirers have completed 5 to 12 deals, and the rest are conducted by 
inexperienced acquirer who have completed less than 5 acquisitions earlier.  
3.3 Descriptive and summary statistics 
[Insert Table 1 Approximately Here] 
Table 1 presents the number of mega-deals over time. We report the statistics for full sample 
and sub-samples divided according to acquisition experience. The fifth merger wave (1993 - 
2000) saw an increase in mega-deals, but it ended with the dot-com bubble. Mega-deal 
activity recovered from the crisis in 2010 and has continued to increase until the last year in 
our sample. After splitting our sample based on the level of acquisition experience, the 
evidence shows an increasing proportion of firms with a high level of experience through 
time, showing a time trend in acquisition experience. To deal with the stationarity issue, our 
                                                          
5 The deal value decile cut-off at the 90th percentile of all U.S. transactions during our sample period is about 
$500mil. Our results remain similar if we define mega-merger size of at least $750 million or $1 billion.  
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paper conducts all analyses and reports the results by using a detrended acquisition 
experience.6  
[Insert Table 2 Approximately Here] 
Table 2 provides the summary deal and firms’ statistics for mega-deals conducted by 
acquirers with different levels of experience. An extensive list of variables likely to influence 
acquisition outcome are employed, and the definition of each variable is listed in Appendix. 
We perform the Student’s t-test and the Wilcoxon test respectively, to examine whether there 
are significant differences of mean and median between mega-deals with more experienced 
acquirers and ones with less experienced acquirers. In general, the evidence shows significant 
differences between the sub-groups.  
In terms of successful mega-deals, we observe that transaction value (Deal Value) 
significantly increase with acquisition experience. In addition, as experience is measured by 
the previous number of acquisitions, there is also a significantly positive relation between 
acquirer size (Market Cap) and acquisition experience. The average deal value and acquirer’s 
market value are nearly $2 billion and $60 billion respectively for mega-deals made by a 
more experienced acquirer, which is about $0.5 billion and $50 billion larger than ones made 
by an inexperienced acquirer. With a larger absolute deal size, however, mega-deals carried 
by more experienced acquirers are considerably smaller when comparing the relative size of 
the deal to acquirer’s size (Relative size for the two groups are 31% and 64%). This might be 
explained by considering that acquirers make a trade-off between synergy gains and 
integration costs as they become larger (Ahern, 2010).   
In addition, the statistics show that mega-deals conducted by more experienced acquirers tend 
to be paid in cash rather than stock, which might be explained by the fact that the cash flow 
ratio (A_CF2TA) is significantly higher for firms with high experience. Specifically, 57% of 
mega-deals conducted by more experienced acquirers are paid entirely with cash and 14% are 
paid entirely with stock in comparison with 33% and 21% for ones conducted by 
inexperienced acquirer, respectively. Moreover, the evidence suggests that mega-deals 
carried out by more experienced acquirers are more likely to involve a public target in 
different industries and are less likely to be competing bid and hostile offers than the 
counterparts carried out by inexperienced acquirers.  
                                                          
6 To detrend acquisition experience, we have pooled all the deals in our sample to regress experience on the 
corresponding year: 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡, where t = 1980, …, 2016. Then the residual is obtained as: 
𝜀𝜀?̂?𝑡 = 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 − (−32.85 + 0.022𝛽𝛽). 
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Similar findings are found for failed mega-deals, but several other statistics deserve attention. 
Specifically, we observe that the Relative size for mega-deals conducted by inexperienced 
acquirers is considerably higher, with an average value of 89%. This provides a potential 
explanation for their failure, suggesting that the deal might be too big and therefore too 
complex for these inexperienced firms to complete. Additionally, the evidence shows that 
failed mega-deals generally have a higher likelihood of involving more than one bidder and 
being a hostile offer than in the successful sample, which is consistent with literature, e.g. 
Schwert (2000).  
 
4. Empirical analysis 
4.1 Do mega-deals undertaken by more experienced acquirers have a higher 
likelihood to successfully complete? 
We begin by investigating whether a mega-deal conducted by a more experienced acquirer 
enjoys a higher completion rate by estimating the following linear probability model: 
𝑃𝑃𝑒𝑒(𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 1) = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 +
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖      (1) 
where Pr denotes probability. The dependent variable (𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖) takes a value of 
one if the mega-deal 𝑒𝑒 is successfully completed, and zero otherwise. Our key explanatory 
variable of interest is the acquisition experience (Experience), which is the detrended number 
of acquisitions that an acquiring firm 𝑒𝑒 completed before. In addition, we also construct a 
dummy variable High Experience Dummy, taking the value of one if the acquiring firm 
conducted more than 12 acquisition before, and zero otherwise. 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖  is a vector of the 
acquiring firm’s characteristics, including the natural logarithm of its market value measured 
4 weeks before the announcement (A_LNMV), the market-to-book ratio (A_TobinQ), the ratio 
of total debt by total capital (A_Leverage) and the ratio of cash flows by the total assets 
(A_CF2TA). 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 represents a vector of deal explanatory variables, including the ratio of 
deal value by the acquirer’s market value measured 4 weeks before the announcement 
(Relative Size), the indicator of target public status (Public), the indicator of competing bids 
(Competing Bid), the indicator of payment method (Stock), the indicator of acquisition 
attitude (Hostile), the indicator of tender offer (Tender), the indicator of whether the acquirer 
and the target are in related industries (Diversification) and the indicator of whether the deal 
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is advised by top investment banks (Top Advisor). In all models, we also control for year and 
firm fixed effects. The models adjust standard errors for clustering.  
[Insert Table 3 Approximately Here] 
Table 3 reports the results of this analysis. The coefficients on Experience and High 
Experience Dummy are positive and highly statistically significant in all specifications, 
suggesting that the probability of completing a mega-deal increases with acquisition 
experience. In specification (2), The magnitude of the coefficient on Experience indicates that 
every additional previous acquisition experience of an acquirer is associated with a 0.31% 
higher likelihood to complete the mega-deal. In specification (4), the involvement of 
acquirers with high experience (High Experience Dummy) increases the probability of 
success by 3.57%. Our results are consistent with our first hypothesis (H1). This can be 
explained by considering that more experienced acquirers excel at dealing with complexities 
during the pre-acquisition process, which might include selecting the right strategy to avoid 
antitrust violation and negotiating with target firms (Dikova et al., 2010).  
In terms of the control variables, the two most important predictors are the hostile offer 
indicator (Hostile) and the competing bid indicator (Competing bid), with significant and 
negative coefficients of -0.4827 and -0.2246, respectively. This suggests that the probability 
of completing a mega-deal drops when the deal attitude is hostile and involves more than one 
bidder. In addition, the results also show that mega-deals with a relative large size are less 
likely to be completed, which is consistent with the evidence presented in descriptive 
statistics.  
4.2 Do mega-deals undertaken by more experienced acquirers create value for 
acquirer shareholders in the short-run? 
This section examines acquirer value creation around the announcement of mega-deals across 
different levels of acquisition experience. Both univariate analysis and multivariate analysis 
are conducted.  
 [Insert Figure 1 and Table 4 Approximately Here] 
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Figure 1 shows the development of acquirer’s average yearly cumulative abnormal return 
over a 3-day event window for mega-deals between 1980 and 2016 7 . Consistent with 
Alexandridis et al. (2017), we observe that there is an improvement in acquirer returns from 
2009 to 2015. However, the returns start to decrease after 2015. Table 4 shows results from 
the univariate analysis, which is divided by the level of acquisition experience and the status 
of deal completion. Three measures of announcement performance are employed. First, we 
report acquirers’ average cumulative abnormal returns over the three-day (-1, +1) 
announcement window (ACAR3). ACAR3 are calculated by using the market-adjusted return 
model,8 with the estimation window [-301, -51] relative to the deal announcement. Overall, 
acquirers of mega-deals have negative mean ACAR3, measuring -0.47% and -1.18% in the 
successful sample and the failed sample, respectively. The higher ACAR3 of successful mega-
deals suggests that the market can distinguish between deals that will be completed or 
terminated at the deal announcement. This is also consistent with Luo (2005) who finds that 
acquirers tend to extract information from announcement returns and then consider whether 
the deal should be completed. After partitioning the sample by acquisition experience level, 
our results indicate that in the successful sample, mega-deals conducted by more experienced 
acquirers on average generate a positive return around the deal announcement (0.09%), which 
is 0.74% higher than those with inexperienced acquirers, and the difference is significant at 
the 5% level. However, acquisition experience seems not to play a major role in the failed 
sample as there is an insignificant difference of ACAR3 between mega-deals undertaken by 
more experienced and less experienced acquirers. 
In addition, we display the results for three-day dollar returns ($Return) and returns per dollar 
spent ($Return/DealValue) in 2016 dollars around deal announcements. The results show a 
similar pattern as the results on ACAR3. Following Malatesta (1983) and Moeller et al. (2005), 
we obtain dollar returns for each deal through multiplying the acquirer’s three-day CARs (-1, 
+1) by the acquirer’s market capitalisation two trading days before the deal announcement 
(event day -2). In the full sample, acquirers of mega-deals, on average, lose approximately 
$97 million in the three days over the announcement period. By comparing sub-samples, the 
results show that in the successful sample, mega-deals carried out by acquirers with high 
experience on average create value of $50 million or $16 cents per dollar spent, while those 
                                                          
7 An Augmented Dickey Fuller Test is conducted to examine whether mega-mergers CAR changes over time 
due to non-stationarity, and the evidence rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting that CAR does not have unit 
root.  
8 Our results are robust when we use other models to measure ACAR3, e.g. Fama-French 5-factor model and 
estimate the model with 5-day event window.   
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carried out by inexperienced acquirers incur large losses of $93 million or 4 cents per dollar 
spent. In the failed sample, mega-deals are subject to shareholder wealth loss regardless of 
the level of acquisition experience, and the dollar losses even increase with the experience 
level which might be due to the high valuation of the more experienced acquiring firm. 
Overall, the results of the univariate analysis is consistent with the second hypothesis (H2), 
suggesting that mega-deals generate gains for shareholders under the execution of more 
experienced acquirers. 
To take related factors into account, we further investigate the relation between mega-deal 
short-run performance and acquisition experience by conducting panel data regression with 
cluster adjusted standard error9: 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                         
(2) 
$𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                         
(3) 
where the dependent variables in Equation (2) and (3) are three-day acquirer cumulative 
abnormal returns and three-day acquirer dollar gains, respectively. Like our analysis on deal 
completion, we examine acquisition experience with a continuous variable Experience which 
is the detrended number of acquisitions that an acquiring firm 𝑒𝑒  completed before, and a 
dummy variable which equals one if the acquiring firm conducted more than 12 acquisitions 
before, and zero otherwise (High Experience Dummy). In addition to the control variables 
employed in Equation (1), we also control for market valuations and an acquirer’s stock run-
up which could exert influence on announcement returns (Bouwman et al., 2009; Petmezas, 
2009). Firm fixed effects and year fixed effects are included in the panel data models using 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 
and 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 respectively.  
 [Insert Table 5 Approximately Here] 
Table 5 presents the results of this analysis. In models of Panel A we regress ACAR3 on 
acquisition experience and in Panel B the dollar gain is regressed on acquisition experience. 
Both analyses are conducted within the full sample, successful sample, and failed sample. In 
Panel A, the coefficients of measures on acquisition experience are positive and statistically 
                                                          
9 Since there are repetitive acquirers, we need to control for within cluster error correlation as advocated by 
Peterson (2009) and Cameron and Miller (2011). This is done by clustering firms using their firm IDs. 
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significant in the full sample and the successful sample. This suggests that acquisition 
experience has a greater impact on the short-run performance of successful mega-deals. 
Specifically, the evidence in specifications 1 and 3 shows that every additional acquisition 
experience significantly helps mega-deals create 0.18% and 0.19% more abnormal 
announcement returns in the full sample and the successful sample, respectively. In terms of 
the coefficient on High Experience Dummy, our results suggest that mega-deals carried by 
more experienced acquirers generally enjoy a higher announcement return of 1.73% in the 
full sample and 2.11% in the successful sample. Regarding failed mega-deals, the evidence 
indicates that the market reactions are insignificantly different to acquirers with different 
levels of acquisition experience, with the coefficient of -0.01% on Experience and 1.35% on 
High Experience Dummy.   
Panel B shows the results of the relation between dollar returns and acquisition experience, 
which is consistent with evidence on abnormal stock returns. We find that $Return is 
significantly positively related to acquisition experience in the overall sample and successful 
sample, while the effects of acquirer experience are insignificant in failed mega-deals. 
Specifically, the coefficients on Experience suggest that with an additional previously 
completed acquisition, mega-deals generate more values of $70 million and $66 million for 
acquirer shareholders in the full sample and the successful sample respectively. For High 
Experience Dummy, the magnitude of the coefficient in model (2) and (4) indicates that 
mega-deals conducted by acquirers with high experience are associated with $407 million 
and $394 million more dollar gains in the full sample and the successful sample respectively. 
Overall, our results of short-run analysis are consistent with the second hypothesis, indicating 
that mega-deals will generate value for shareholders if the deal is conducted by acquirers with 
more experience.   
With regard to control variables in all regressions, the coefficients on the logarithm of the 
bidders’ market capitalization one month before the deal announcement (A_LNMV) are 
significantly negative, suggesting that the market is less in favour of mega-deals involving 
larger bidders, which is consistent with Moeller et al. (2004). In addition, ACAR3 is 
significantly higher if the acquirer has a higher leverage ratio (A_Leverage) and a higher cash 
flow ratio (A_CF2TA), which supports the study of Maloney et al. (1993) and Harford (1999). 
Moreover, in line with Travlos (1987), mega-deals that are fully paid for in stock 
considerably destroy more abnormal returns for acquirers’ shareholders.  
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4.3 Do mega-deals undertaken by more experienced acquirers create value for 
acquirer’s shareholders in the long-run? 
In the previous section, our results indicate that acquirers make use of previous successful 
experience and more experienced acquirers are rewarded at the announcement of mega-deals. 
To investigate whether a more experienced acquirer eventually helps a mega-deal create more 
value, this section assesses long-run performance based on bidders’ abnormal stock returns 
and post-merger operating performance. Stock price returns are employed to examine the 
market valuation of the mega transaction while the accounting-based approach investigates 
the achieved operational changes during the same period. If acquirers with high experience 
are more proficient at the integration process, we would expect to find a better long-run 
performance. Both univariate and multivariate analyses are displayed.   
4.3.1 Long-run stock performance 
[Insert Table 6 Approximately Here] 
Table 6 presents the mean buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs) for bidders over 12-, 24- 
and 36-month periods and draws a comparison between the BHARs of more and less 
experienced acquirers based on deal completion status. Acquirer BHARs are computed by 
using size- and book-to-market ratio-adjusted returns and the t-statistics are bootstrapped in 
order to eliminate the new listing bias and rebalancing bias (Lyon et al., 1999). In terms of 
the full sample, we observe that mega-deals remarkably destroy value for acquirer 
shareholders in the long term, regardless of the completion status and event windows 
employed.   
After dividing the sample based on the level of acquirer experience, we find a significant 
positive relation between BHARs and acquisition experience, which supports our hypothesis 
suggesting that acquirer experience plays an essential role in helping mega-deals create value. 
For successful mega-deals, those with more experienced acquirers generate abnormal returns 
of -0.13%, -2.19%, and 0.95% over the 12-, 24-, and 36-month period after the deal 
announcement, which are 3.94%, 5.80%, and 8.97% higher than their counterparts with less 
experienced acquirers and the differences are significant at the 5% level. The difference 
between mega-deals carried out by more experienced acquirers and inexperienced acquirers 
becomes even larger in the failed sample, reaching 8.19%, 12.83%, and 23.46% for BHAR12, 
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BHAR24, and BHAR36, respectively. This finding is mainly because terminated mega-deals 
by inexperienced acquirers destroy value considerably. Failure to complete the deal is more 
costly for inexperienced acquirers, implying that market does not welcome incompetent firms 
to conduct mega-deals but unable to consummate. 
 [Insert Table 7 Approximately Here] 
To confirm the superior performance of mega-deals conducted by more experienced acquirer, 
in Table 7, we perform the long-term panel data regression analysis with cluster adjusted 
standard error as follows: 
 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴36𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                        
(4) 
where BHAR36 is modelled as a function of the acquisition experience measures. A set of 
firm, deal, and market characteristics is controlled, which is described in the analysis on 
short-run performance, and we also ichelnclude year fixed effects and firm fixed effects.   
In accordance with the univariate results and our hypothesis, a mega-deal’s long-run 
performance is positively associated with both experience measurements in all regressions. 
Specifically, in terms of the successful sample, Experience and High Experience Dummy 
remarkably increase the long-run abnormal returns by 0.71% and 21.65% in specifications (1) 
and (2), respectively. Regarding the failed sample, the coefficients of Experience and High 
Experience Dummy are positive but insignificant. Overall, our evidence suggests that more 
experienced acquirers are rewarded by the market if they successfully conduct mega-deals.  
Consistent with the evidence of short-term analysis, we find that the 36-month BHARs are 
remarkably higher if the bidder has a higher cash flow ratio (A_CF2TA), while the coefficient 
of Stock is negative and significant in all specifications. In addition, the coefficient on Market 
Valuation suggests that acquirers would suffer lower long-run returns if they undertake mega-
deals during the high valuation stock market, which is in line with Petmezas (2009).   
 
4.3.2 Long-run operating performance  
Previous analyses show that mega-deals with more experienced acquirers deliver 
significantly more returns to shareholders than ones with less experienced acquirers. If the 
reason behind is that more experienced acquirers can manage the complexity of mega 
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transactions better than ones with less experience, we should also expect to find a better long-
run operating performance for mega-deals carried by more experienced acquirers.  
[Insert Table 8 Approximately Here] 
Following Healy et al. (1992), Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003), and Alexandridis et al. 
(2013), we employ the return on assets (ROA) adjusted by industry to measure the operating 
performance for bidders. ROA is the ratio of net income to the book value of total assets, 10 
and then we adjust the ratio by deducting the median ROA of peers in the same industry in a 
given year11. Table 8 reports the bidder’s operating performance characterized by different 
levels of experience for up to three years relative to the year of the deal announcement.  
Panel A shows the results of successful mega-deals. Overall, we observe different levels of 
operating performance across the acquisition experience levels. Acquirers with high 
experience exhibit superior operating performance than inexperienced acquirers both before 
and after the announcement of mega-deals. In addition, for all acquirers completing mega-
deals, there is a general decreasing performance from year -1 to year +3 around the deal 
announcement. This suggests that firms typically choose a time of good operating 
performance to prepare a mega-deal but it is difficult to improve or even sustain that level of 
performance over a long-run period following a mega-transaction. Compared to acquirers 
with high experience, however, inexperienced acquirers show a bigger drop in post-merger 
performance. Specifically, the median ROA of acquirers with low experience for the three 
years pre-acquisition is 2.97% and decrease to 2.81% over the three-year period after the 
mega-deal announcement, where the difference is 0.15% and significant at the 5% level. For 
acquirers with high experience, on the other hand, the post-merger operating performance 
decreases insignificantly, by 0.10%. This pattern also exists in the operating performance for 
the failed sample in Panel B. The outperformance of more experienced acquirers is consistent 
with the hypothesis and our previous findings of the better short-run and long-run stock 
performance.  
To further investigate the relation between operating performance following mega-deals and 
acquisition experience, this paper conducts the fixed effect regression as follows: 
  𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                        
(5) 
                                                          
10 The results are robust when we use operating income rather than net income to calculate ROA.  
11 The paper employs the 12-industry classification by Fama and French. 
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,where the dependent variable is the difference in the acquirer’s ROA between the pre- and 
post-merger period. Our key variable of interest is 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 , while the 
regressions also control for firm and deal factors that can determine operating performance 
and are described in previous equations. Both firm fixed effect and year fixed effect are 
included in our model. 
[Insert Table 9 Approximately Here] 
Table 9 displays the regression results, showing that the changes in post-merger operating 
performance are positively associated with acquisition experience, and the coefficients on 
acquisition experience are significant in models (1) and (2) of successful sample. Specifically, 
the coefficient on Experience in column (1) suggests that every additional completed 
acquisition is related to 0.15% ROA improvement over the three-year period following a 
mega-deal announcement. In addition, the magnitude of acquisition experience impact 
increases to 2.76% when the 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴 is regressed on High Experience Dummy, suggesting that 
acquirers with high experience generally have a better operating performance improvement 
than less experienced acquirers after the completion of mega-deals. In the failed sample, we 
find that acquisition experience has only an insignificant effect on an acquirer’s post-merger 
operating performance changes. Overall, the evidence is supportive of our hypothesis and 
indicates that to deal with the complexity of mega-deals and achieve better performance, it is 
essential for acquiring firms to gather more experience before conducting mega transactions.   
In terms of firm and deal characteristics, our analysis shows that there is a greater operating 
performance improvement after mega-deals when acquirers are with high leverage ratio 
(A_Leverage), which is an indication that more financially constrained bidders under better 
creditor monitoring tend to conduct better deals. In addition, acquirers with a high cash flow 
ratio (A_CF2TA) are significantly related to a smaller 𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴𝛥𝛥𝐴𝐴, which is consistent with Jensen's 
(1986) free cash flow theory suggesting that large free cash flows can lead to agency problem. 
Moreover, consistent with the regression of short-run and long-run stock performance, we 
observe a significant and negative sign of Stock in the successful sample.  
 
5. Robustness checks 
5.1 Endogeneity issue 
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Previous sections suggest a positive relation between mega-deals performance and acquirer’s 
acquisition experience, but our results could also be driven by self-selection based 
endogeneity. As strategic corporate decisions, mergers and acquisitions are discrete choices 
driven by manager’s anticipated performance instead of a random pattern (Castañer et al., 
2014; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2003; Sampson, 2004). There could be omitted variables 
driving such expectations of performance, e.g. managerial skill and social pressure, which are 
likely to influence both the takeover decision and the performance outcome. As every 
takeover decision is subject to self-selection bias, the accumulation of acquisition experience 
also tends to be endogenous (Haleblian et al., 2006). For example, a firm that has the 
capability of conducting a value-increasing takeover will have a high level of acquisition 
experience and also enjoy better performance with mega-deals.     
To account for the potential endogeneity issue, our study employs the Instrumental Variable 
(IV) approach and conducts the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression to analyze the 
effect of acquisition experience on mega-deals’ performance. We use firm location and firm 
age as the instrument variables to predict firm acquisition experience, which is motivated by 
previous research suggesting that firms will have more acquisition opportunities and 
undertake more deals if they are older and located in metropolitan statistical areas (Almazan 
et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2016).12 Specifically, a dummy variable Urban is constructed, taking 
the value of one if the firm is headquartered in the 10 largest metropolitan statistical areas on 
the U.S. government list, and zero otherwise. In addition, a firm’s age is estimated with the 
duration between the earliest year of a firm listed in Compustat and the year of the mega-deal 






𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝛽𝛽𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼4𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖  + 𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦
+𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖      
𝐴𝐴
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒� 𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦
+ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖
    
 
 (6) 
, where the first stage is the regression of acquisition experience on the instrumental variables 
𝑈𝑈𝑒𝑒𝑈𝑈𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 and 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 as well as the firm and deal characteristics. In the second stage, mega—
                                                          
12 According to U.S. Office of Management and Budget, metropolitan statistical area (MAS) represents an area 




deals’ performance is regressed against the model-estimated 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝛽𝛽𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒� 𝑖𝑖 from 
the first stage in addition to a set of related control variables. Firm and year fixed-effect are 
included in the analyses. 
[Insert Table 10 Approximately Here] 
Table 10 shows the estimates from the 2SLS regression of mega-deals announcement 
performance. Consistent with previous literature, the evidence in the first-stage indicates that 
firm experience is significantly greater within the 10 largest metropolitan statistical areas and 
increases with firm age, regardless of whether we use continuous variable Experience or 
dummy variable High Experience Dummy to measure a firm’s acquisition experience. In 
addition, the existence of endogeneity, the validity and the strength of instrument variable are 
tested and reported. Specifically, the p-value of 0.0135 from the Hausman test is the 5% level 
of significance where the null hypothesis can be rejected, suggesting that acquisition 
experience is not exogenous in our analysis. The insignificant estimate from the Sargan test 
and the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic that is greater than 10 imply that the instruments are 
valid and our IV regression is not affected by the weak instrument issue.  
Regarding the second-stage results, the coefficient on Predicted Experience is 0.0024 in 
Model (2) and on Predicted High Experience Dummy is 0.0197 in Model (4), and both are 
significant at the 5% level. This suggests that mega-deals with more experienced acquirers 
create more value for acquirer’s shareholders, which confirms our previous results.  
 
5.2 Threshold model of short-run stock performance 
This paper tests the robustness of our results on the relation between firm’s acquisition 
experience and mega-deal’s performance by conducting a threshold model following Hansen 
(2000). The fundamental advantage of the threshold regression is that the existence of 
breakpoint can be endogenously detected and determined, and therefore this enables us to 
examine that to what extent the acquisition experience could translate into the capability of 
successfully conducting a mega-merger. The threshold model is constructed as follows: 
𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3𝑖𝑖
= �
𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼2𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 + 𝛼𝛼3𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦 + 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖  𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 ≤  𝛾𝛾 




where 𝐴𝐴𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴3𝑖𝑖  represents acquirer’s three-day cumulative abnormal return; 𝐴𝐴𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑖 is 
the number of acquisitions completed by an acquirer before the mega-deal of our interest, 
which is the key explanatory variable and also the threshold variable; 𝐹𝐹𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖 and 𝐷𝐷𝑒𝑒𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 are 
vectors of acquirer’s and deal’s characteristics, respectively; 𝑓𝑓𝑦𝑦 is year fixed effects and 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 
is firm fixed effects; 𝛾𝛾 represents the threshold value to be estimated.  
[Insert Table 11 Approximately Here] 
Table 11 reports the results of the threshold regression. It is confirmed that there is a single 
threshold on acquisition experience equal to four. The coefficients confirm our previous 
results that mega-deals with more experienced acquirers significantly generate more 
abnormal gains for shareholders around deal announcement. Interestingly, the evidence 
shows that the coefficient of Experience is significantly positive when acquirers completed 
more than 4 acquisitions before (0.0027), whereas it is insignificant when Experience is less 
than or equal to the threshold value (0.0028). This suggests that firms with four or less than 
four completed acquisitions have not accumulated enough experience for mega-deal and are 
incapable of successfully conduct a value-increasing transaction. In contrast, for acquirers 
with more than four completed acquisitions, their accumulated experience is able to turn into 
sophisticated skills and therefore, following the fourth acquisition, the performance of mega-
deal increases with every additional acquisition experience.    
 
5.3 Pre- and Post-2009 Acquirer’s Performance  
[Insert Table 12 Approximately Here] 
Alexandridis et al. (2007) suggests that mega-deals during the post-2009 period are value-
increasing investment for acquirers, while mega-deals before 2009 are subject to negative 
abnormal announcement returns. To take this evidence into account, we conduct analysis to 
investigate whether acquisition experience plays a role in mega-deals completion and gains in 
both pre-2009 and post-2009 period. Models (1) and (2) reports linear probability model of 
mega-deal completion while models (3) and (4) shows panel data regressions of acquirer’s 
short-run performance over time periods of 1980-2009 and 2010-2016.  As seen in the table 
12, the coefficients of Experience are significantly positive in all models, regardless of the 
time period. Specifically, Experience considerably increases the probability of completing 
mega-deals by 0.19% and 0.62% over the period of 1980-2009 and 2010-2016, respectively. 
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In addition, short-run abnormal returns are increased with acquisition experience by 0.17% 
and 0.29% over two periods, respectively. This confirms the positive role of acquirer’s 
experience playing in mega-deals, which is consistent with previous results.  
 
5.4 Robustness Check for Definition on Acquisition Experience 
[Insert Table 13 Approximately Here] 
This paper employs the number of M&As transactions as the proxy for acquirer’s acquisition 
experience. To investigate whether this proxy captures the learning mechanisms, we follow 
Aktas et al., (2013) and conduct an additional test to examine the relation between the deal 
order number (DON), i.e. the mega-deal’s sequence for a given acquirer, and the time elapsed 
between successive deals (TBD), i.e. the number of days between the most recent completed 
deal and the announcement date of the current mega-deal. According to Hayward (2002), 
learning increases with TBD in experience building situation and decreases with TBD in 
memory loss situations. Therefore, the sample is divided into short TBD and long TBD 
subsamples. Short and long TBD are TBDs below and above the sample median respectively. 
Experience-related variables, e.g. investment banks’ reputation, CEO experience and serial 
acquirers, are included in the analysis. The results show that TBD is negatively related to 
DON for short TBD subsample but positively related to DON for long TBD subsample, which 
is consistent with Aktas et al., (2013) and suggests the existence of learning mechanism.  
 
5.5 Robustness Check for Acquirer’s Long-run Stock Performance 
[Insert Table 14 Approximately Here] 
In terms of acquirer’s long-run stock performance, we follow Mitchell and Stafford's (2000) 
and employ calendar-time portfolio methodology to conduct a robustness check. Specifically, 
we construct Equal-Weight and Value-Weight portfolios of sample firms that conducted 
mega-deal during the previous 36 months. Portfolios are reconstructed every month by 
deleting firms that at the end of their 36 months period and adding firms that have just 
conducted a deal. The portfolio excess returns are regressed on the Fama and French (1993) 
three-factor model. Only successful deals are examined. The results are presented in Table 
14 and show that experienced acquirers tend to have better stock performance in the long-run, 




Mega-deals, as a strategic move, play an essential role in firm’s development which could 
also reshape the industry and even influence the whole economy. However, prior literature 
has investigated mega-deals as an independent event and suggests that large deals generally 
destroy value for acquirer shareholders except ones conducted after 2009. This paper 
provides evidence on how mega-deals can enjoy a bright outcome, showing that firms with 
more acquisition experience make better mega-deal decisions. Specifically, we conduct 
several analyses of mega-deals’ outcomes, including deal completion, acquisition 
announcement returns and long-run returns, as well as post-deal operating performance.   
Our main findings show that mega-deals carried out by acquirers with a higher level of 
experience are more likely to complete and enjoy a better stock and operating performance in 
both the short- and long-run, regardless of whether the deal is completed or failed. In 
particular, the average abnormal announcement returns of successful mega-deals translate 
into a shareholder value gain of $50.6 million. For failed mega-deals, inexperienced acquirers 
suffer from the continuing decline in a firm’s performance while more experienced acquirers 
recover from the failure over the three-year following the mega-deal’s announcement. 
Overall, our evidence suggests that although mega-deals involve great uncertainty and 
integration complexity, the whole process can be better facilitated by acquirers with a higher 
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Panel A:  
Dependent Variables  
 
Completion Dummy variable that equals 1 if merger transaction is 
completed. 
ACAR3 Cumulative abnormal return of the acquiring firm in the 3-
day event window (−1, +1) surrounded on the announcement 
day. The expected returns are from a market-adjusted return 
model with the parameters estimated over 301 trading days 
ending 51 days before the announcement. As benchmark we 
use the CRSP value-weighted index. 
$Return Following Malatesta (1983) and Moeller et al. (2005), 
$Return is obtained by multiplying the acquirer’s three-day 
CARs (ACAR3) by the acquirer’s market capitalisation two 
trading days before the deal announcement (event day -2). 
BHAR36 Buy-and-hold abnormal return of the acquiring firm from 
size-adjusted model in the 36-month event window following 
the announcement.  
ΔROA The difference in the acquirer’s industry-adjusted ROA 
between -3 and +3 years relative to deal announcement. ROA 
is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets. 
Industry-adjusted ROA is calculated by subtracting the 
median ROA of the corresponding industry from the firm 
ROA.  
TBD Following Aktas et al., (2013), TBD is defined as the number 
of days between the most recent completed deal and the 
announcement date of the current mega-deal. Short TBD is a 
TBD below the sample median. Long TBD is a TBD above 
the sample median. 




Experience The detrended number of acquisitions that a sample acquiring 
firm completed before the mega-deal of interest. 
High Experience Dummy Dummy variable that equals 1 if mega-deals conducted by 
acquirers with high experience (more than 12 acquisitions 
completed before). 
Panel C:  
Firm characteristics 
 
A_LNMV The logarithm of the acquirer market value measured 4 weeks 
before the merger announcement. The market value is 
calculated as the number of shares outstanding multiplied by 
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the respective stock price at 4 weeks before the M&As 
announcement. 
Market-to-book (A_M2B) The ratio of market value by book value of the acquirer's 
assets. 
FCF-to-asset (A_CF2TA) The ratio of acquirer’s cash flows by the total assets at the 
fiscal year end before the M&As announcement. 
Leverage (A_Leverage) The ratio of acquirer’s total debt by total capital at the fiscal 
year end before the M&As announcement. 
Acquirer stock run-up 
(Run-up) 
The market-adjusted return of acquiring firms over the period 
from 200 trading days to 2 months before the merger 
announcement. 
CEO Experience The number of acquisitions that acquirer’s CEO completed 
before the mega-deal of interest. 
Serial Acquirers Acquirers that conduct more than two deals over a three-year 
window before the mega-deal of interest. 
CTAR12/24/36 Calendar time abnormal return of the acquiring firm in the 
12-, 24- and 36-month event window following the 
announcement.  
Panel D:  
Deal characteristics 
 
Deal Value Value of the transaction in millions of Dollars. 
Relative Size (RTV) The variable was calculated as merger transaction value 
divided by the acquirer market value of equity 4 weeks before 
the merger announcement.  
Hostile Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal attitude is identified 
as hostile. 
Stock Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is 100% paid by 
stock. 
Competing Bid Dummy variable that equals 1 if there are more than one 
bidder. 
Public Dummy variable that equals 1 if the target is a public firm. 
Tender Dummy variable that equals 1 if the deal is identified as a 
tender offer. 
Diversification Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquirer and the target 
have the different first two-digit of primary SIC code. 
Time to Completion Gap period between merger announcement date and 
completion date. 
Market Valuation Following Bouwman et al. (2009), we identify high-, neutral- 
and low-valuation markets by comparing the detrended P/E 
ratio of the value-weighted market index with its past 5-year 
average. 
Top Advisor Following Rau (2000), we identify top advisors by using SDC 
league table of investment banking. Top Advisor equals 1 if 
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the investment bank averagely ranks the top 5. 
DON The mega-deal’s sequence for a given acquirer. 
Panel E:  
Instrumental variables 
 
Urban Dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm is 
headquartered in the 10 largest metropolitan statistical areas 
on the U.S. government list. 
Age The difference between the year of acquiring firm listed in 


























Figure 1 – The Evolution of Mega-Deals 3-Day Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
This figure shows the development of acquirer’s average yearly cumulative abnormal return over a 3-













Table 1 – Number of Mega-deals 
This table reports the number of mega-deals by year. It also shows the annual number of mega-deals 
by acquirer’s previous acquisition experience. The statistics are provided based on a sample of 3,544 
U.S. M&A samples with the transaction value of at least $500 million in 2016 dollar terms. The 
announcement date is between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2016. The acquirer owns less than 
10% of target’s shares prior to the deal announcement and more than 50% after the deal. The acquirer 
is not from financial industry (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities industry (SIC code 4900-4949). 
Acquirers are public firms with stock price data and accounting data available on CRSP and 
Compustat, respectively. 
  Full Sample Firm Experience 
Year 
 
Low (1) Moderate (2) High (3) 
1980 14 14 0 0 
1981 37 37 0 0 
1982 32 30 2 0 
1983 33 28 5 0 
1984 76 57 18 1 
1985 87 60 27 0 
1986 86 57 28 1 
1987 81 51 28 2 
1988 92 38 49 5 
1989 76 27 45 4 
1990 27 11 15 1 
1991 30 12 15 3 
1992 32 12 18 2 
1993 51 22 25 4 
1994 85 34 37 14 
1995 88 27 50 11 
1996 125 34 75 16 
1997 184 67 87 30 
1998 178 55 82 41 
1999 215 57 102 56 
2000 235 83 93 59 
2001 99 30 44 25 
2002 74 21 32 21 
2003 66 21 21 24 
2004 89 24 35 30 
2005 105 30 47 28 
2006 126 27 52 47 
2007 116 33 54 29 
2008 79 12 39 28 
2009 66 11 26 29 
2010 102 19 43 40 
2011 91 13 40 38 
2012 116 23 51 42 
2013 118 23 43 52 
2014 141 42 51 48 
2015 176 46 54 76 
2016 116 23 43 50 





Table 2 – Summary statistics 
This table reports the summary statistics of 3,544 U.S. M&A samples with the transaction value of at least $500 million in 2016 dollar terms. Panel A and Panel B show deal 
related characteristics and acquirer related characteristic, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix. M&A deals are restricted by the following criteria. First, the 
announcement date is between January 1, 1980 and December 31, 2016. Second, the acquirer is a public firms and the target firm can be public, private or subsidiary. Third, 
the inflation-adjusted deal value is at least $500 million. Fourth, the acquirer owns less than 10% of target’s shares prior to the deal announcement and more than 50% after 
the deal. Fifth, the acquirer is not from financial industry (SIC code 6000-6999) and utilities industry (SIC code 4900-4949). Last but not least, the acquirer has stock price 
data and accounting data available on Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and Compustat, respectively. First, we present the mean and median values for the full 
sample. Next, we sub-divide our sample based on whether the deal is completed and the level of acquisition experience. All continuous variables are winsored at 1% and 99% 
level. The t-test and Wilcoxon test are used to test for statistical significance of means and medians, respectively. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, ** and * respectively. 
        Successful sample     Failed sample   
  
Full 
sample  Firm experience Firm experience 
      Low (1) Moderate (2) High (3) Dif. (3)-(1) Low (4) Moderate (5) High (6) Dif. (6)-(4) 
Panel A - Deal 
characteristics 
          Deal value ($mil) Mean 1609.41 1308.56 1385.37 1845.06 536.50*** 1636.66 1708.93 2403.13 766.47*** 
(adjusted by 2016) Median 1194.28 1002.37 1142.12 1571.99 569.62*** 1236.64 1877.70 1803.60 566.96*** 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 Relative size Mean 0.52 0.64 0.56 0.31 -0.33*** 0.89 0.89 0.58 -0.31*** 
 
Median 0.23 0.38 0.22 0.09 -0.29*** 0.83 0.42 0.12 -0.71 
 
N 3,911 991 1,272 755 
 
208 192 99 
 All stock % Mean 18.43% 21.26% 19.03% 13.98% -7.27%*** 18.18% 20.62% 12.12% -6.06% 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 All cash %  Mean 43.40% 33.43% 42.04% 57.12% 23.69%*** 33.49% 46.91% 70.71% 37.21%*** 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 Competition % Mean 7.25% 4.79% 4.60% 2.77% -2.02%** 26.32% 32.99% 10.10% -16.21%*** 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 Public % Mean 67.61% 60.18% 66.07% 67.28% 7.10%*** 84.21% 86.08% 93.94% 9.73%*** 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 Hostile % Mean 5.56% 2.30% 2.03% 0.92% -1.37%** 31.10% 28.87% 20.20% -10.90%*** 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 Diversified % Mean 30.70% 29.24% 30.81% 33.51% 4.27%* 34.93% 27.84% 19.19% -15.74%*** 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
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Time to completion Mean 154.27 144.23 155.95 165.02 20.79* 
    
 
Median 95.00 97.00 96.00 93.50 -3.50 
    
 
N 3,042 1,002 1,282 758 
     Tender % Mean 16.62% 17.07% 17.00% 15.44% -1.63% 22.97% 13.92% 8.08% -14.89%*** 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 Market Valuation Mean 0.94 1.02 0.94 0.79 -0.22*** 1.00 0.94 0.96 -0.05 
 
N 3,544 1,002 1,282 758 
 
209 194 99 
 Panel B - Acquirer 
characteristics 
          Market cap ($mil) Mean 22697.72 8520.71 14762.04 58624.73 50104.02*** 6054.25 12820.44 46577.21 40522.96*** 
(adjusted by 2016) Median 6564.12 3522.24 6409.02 24899.02 21376.78*** 2180.43 5311.66 16156.92 13976.49*** 
 
N 3,517 991 1,272 755 
 
208 192 99 
 Market-to-book Mean 4.67 4.38 4.63 4.81 0.43 3.67 4.26 5.85 2.18 
 
Median 2.88 2.40 2.91 3.37 0.97*** 2.32 3.01 3.43 1.11*** 
 
N 2,565 669 936 603 
 
146 133 78 
 FCF-to-asset Mean 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.01*** 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.01 
 
Median 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.01*** 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.00 
 
N 2,553 671 925 597 
 
147 134 79 
 Leverage Mean 0.37 0.35 0.36 0.36 0.01 0.42 0.43 0.37 -0.05 
 
Median 0.34 0.32 0.35 0.34 0.02 0.38 0.42 0.35 -0.02 
 
N 2,573 677 937 601 
 
147 133 78 
 Acquirer stock run-up % Mean 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.06 -0.05*** 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.00 
 
Median 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05 -0.03*** 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.02 
 
N 3,439 929 1,271 753 
 
194 193 99 
 Acquisition experience 
(Number of completed 
acquisition) 
  
Mean 7.89 2.02 6.54 19.59 17.57*** 0.97 5.00 15.25 14.28*** 
Median 5.00 2.00 6.00 17.00 15.00*** 1.00 5.00 13.00 12.00*** 
N 3,544 1002 1282 758   209 194 99   
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Table 3 – Linear probability models of deal completion 
This table reports results of linear probability model of mega-deal completion. The key variables in 
Models (1) and (2) are Experience and in Model (3) and (4) are High Experience Dummy. Experience 
is the detrended number of acquisition completed before the mega-deal of our interest. High 
Experience Dummy takes the value of 1 if the mega-deal is carried by acquirers with a high level of 
experience, i.e. more than 12 completed acquisitions, and 0 otherwise. All models include firm and 
year fixed effects. For brevity, their coefficients are not reported in the table. Detailed variable 
definitions are shown in the Appendix B. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. P-value is reported in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, ** and * respectively. 
Completion Model Model  Model Model  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 




  High Experience Dummy 
 
 0.0523*** 0.0357** 
  
 (0.000) (0.039) 
A_LNMV 0.0138** 0.001 0.0066 0.0023 
 
(0.011) (0.872) (0.182) (0.707) 
A_M2B -0.0001 0 -0.0001 0 
 
(0.651) (0.833) (0.648) (0.797) 
A_CF2TA 0.0549 0.1242 0.0281 0.1297 
 
(0.610) (0.204) (0.746) (0.183) 
A_Leverage -0.0088 -0.037 -0.0321 -0.0396 
 









































































Constant -0.0215 0.012 -2.0417 0.0131 
 
(0.126) (0.433) (0.213) (0.360) 
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2,498 2,498 2,498 2,498 
Adjusted R2 0.055 0.23 0.055 0.231 
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Table 4 – Acquirer short-run performance analysis 
This table reports mean and median values on measures of acquirer’s announcement performance, including ACAR3, 
$Return, and $Return/DealValue. ACAR3 is acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return over 3-day event window 
surrounding the announcement date. $Return is dollar gains calculated through multiplying ACAR3 by the acquirer’s 
market capitalisation two trading days prior to the announcement day. $Return/DealValue is dollar gains per dollar 
spent, which is the ratio of $Return and deal value. First, we present the values for the full sample. Next, we sub-
divide our sample based on whether the deal is completed and the level of acquisition experience. The t-test and 
Wilcoxon test are used to test for statistical significance of means and medians, respectively. Significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Full sample        
  ACAR3 $Return $Return/DealValue 
Panel A: Successful sample 
  Mean -0.0047*** -97.8839** 0.0065 
Median -0.0005 -1.6892 -0.0014 
N 2,970 2,940 2940 
Panel B: Failed sample 
  Mean -0.0118*** -97.4907 -0.0214 
Median -0.0042 -10.6411 -0.0087* 
N 495 490 490 
Diff (B)-(A) 
   Mean -0.0071* 0.3933 -0.0278 
Median -0.0037* -8.9519 -0.0073 
 Low experience       
  ACAR3 $Return $Return/DealValue 
Panel C: Successful sample 
  Mean -0.0065** -93.2032* -0.0372 
Median -0.0025 -4.7123 -0.0044 
N 958 947 947 
Panel D: Failed sample 
  Mean -0.0097 -63.5130*** -0.0374 
Median -0.0039 -6.0548 -0.0058 
N 204 203 203 
Diff (D)-(C) 
   Mean -0.0032 29.6901 -0.0002 
Median -0.0014 -1.3425 -0.0014 
Moderate experience        
  ACAR3 $Return $Return/DealValue 
Panel E: Successful sample 
  Mean -0.0066*** -156.8446*** -0.0514 
Median -0.0016 -5.1310 -0.0039 
N 1,260 1,250 1,250 
Panel F: Failed sample 
  Mean -0.0176*** -111.9517*** -0.0268 
Median -0.0057 -19.8914 -0.0124 
N 192 190 190 
Diff (F)-(E) 
   Mean -0.0110* 44.8929 0.0247 
Median -0.0041 -14.7604 -0.0085 
 High experience       
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  ACAR3 $Return $Return/DealValue 
Panel G: Successful sample 
  Mean 0.0009 50.6119 0.1596 
Median 0.0014 19.3941 0.0155 
N 752 749 749 
Panel H: Failed sample 
  Mean -0.0047 -140.2728 0.0229 
Median -0.0028 -13.8302 -0.0112 
N 99 99 99 
Diff (H)-(G) 
   Mean -0.0055 -190.8847 -0.1367 
Median -0.0042 -33.2243 -0.0267 
The difference between low experience and more experience 
 
ACAR3 $Return $Return/DealValue 
 Panel I: Successful sample 
   Diff (G)-(C) 
   Mean 0.0074** 143.8151 0.1968* 
Median 0.0039 24.1063 0.0199** 
Panel J: Failed sample 
   Diff (H)-(D) 
   Mean 0.0050 -76.7598* 0.0603 






















Table 5 – Panel data regressions of acquirer short-term performance 
This table reports panel data regressions of acquirer’s short-term performance. ACAR3 is the dependent variable in 
models of Panel A, which is acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return over 3-day event window surrounding the 
announcement date. $Return is the dependent variable in models of Panel B, which is the product of ACAR3 and 
acquirer’s market capitalisation on event day -2. Experience is the detrended number of acquisition completed before 
the mega-deal of our interest. High Experience Dummy takes the value of 1 if the mega-deals is carried by acquirers 
with a high level of experience, i.e. more than 12 completed acquisitions, and 0 otherwise. Models (1) and (2) include 
the sample of all mega-deals. Models (3) and (4) utilise the sample of successful mega-deals. Models (5) and (6) 
examine the sample of failed mega-deals. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions 
are shown in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. We report p-value in 
parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Panel A ACAR3 
 
Full Sample Successful Failed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Experience 0.0018**   0.0019**   -0.0001  
 
(0.014)  (0.013)  (0.943)  High Experience Dummy 
 
0.0173**  0.0211**  0.0135 
  
(0.042)  (0.033)  (0.519) 
A_LNMV -0.0094** -0.0058* -0.0053** 0.0062* -0.0248** -0.0137* 
 
(0.032) (0.071) (0.024) (0.065) (0.022) (0.074) 
A_M2B 0.0003*   0.0001 0.0003*   0.0001 0.0028 0.0018 
 
(0.076) (0.228) (0.060) (0.525) (0.546) (0.253) 
A_CF2TA 0.0937**  0.0879** 0.1122*   0.1194** 0.0746 0.0386 
 
(0.034) (0.030) (0.071) (0.037) (0.667) (0.807) 
A_Leverage 0.0196** 0.0172* 0.0058** 0.0062* 0.0582* 0.0951* 
 
(0.017) (0.052) (0.049) (0.060) (0.068) (0.079) 
RTV 0.0032 0.0024 0.0049 0.0037 0.0252 0.0217 
 
(0.655) (0.736) (0.587) (0.676) (0.123) (0.119) 
Public -0.0178*** -0.0149** -0.0169**  -0.0138* -0.0097 0.0000 
 
(0.003) (0.018) (0.016) (0.073) (0.837) (1.000) 
Competing Bid -0.0073 -0.0057 -0.0092 -0.0077 -0.0365*   -0.0275 
 
(0.653) (0.722) (0.709) (0.755) (0.092) (0.170) 
Stock -0.0041** -0.007* -0.0057** -0.0098* -0.0647**  -0.0636*** 
 
(0.034) (0.052) (0.036) (0.086) (0.033) (0.007) 
Diversification -0.0195*** -0.0181*** -0.0205*** -0.0201*** 0.0102 0.006 
 
(0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.528) (0.687) 
Tender 0.0147*   0.0144* 0.0169*   0.0151 0.0154 0.0174 
 
(0.065) (0.071) (0.075) (0.112) (0.375) (0.312) 
Hostile -0.007 -0.0075 0.0228 0.0233 -0.0041 -0.0116 
 
(0.693) (0.661) (0.574) (0.561) (0.862) (0.510) 
Market Valuation -0.001 0.0033 -0.003 0.0025 0.0008 0.0029 
 
(0.772) (0.591) (0.489) (0.321) (0.837) (0.778) 
Run-up 0.0006 -0.0067 -0.0043 -0.0125 0.0082 0.0285 
 
(0.935) (0.457) (0.667) (0.322) (0.716) (0.122) 
Top Advisor 0.0058 0.0055 0.006 0.006 -0.0109 -0.0136 
 
(0.399) (0.420) (0.433) (0.421) (0.745) (0.597) 
Constant 0.0322 0.0386 2.1402 1.4773 1.1373 0.8675 
 
(0.637) (0.434) (0.176) (0.308) (0.781) (0.779) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       N 2,432 2,432 2,090 2,090 342 342 
 37 
Adjusted R2 0.046 0.013 0.04 0.018 0.029 0.013 
 
Panel B $Return 
 
Full Sample Successful Failed 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Experience 70.4436**   66.2130**   7.2913 
 
 
(0.032)  (0.049)  (0.832) 
 High Experience Dummy  407.4888**  394.4302*  227.7177 
 
 (0.018)  (0.061)  (0.771) 
A_LNMV -135.3089 -40.1176 -266.9458 -431.8359*   -147.9648 -101.4657 
 
(0.307) (0.932) (0.226) (0.091) (0.803) (0.886) 
A_M2B 21.6699 10.7404 3.7518 -8.2332 -204.1487* -195.1392 
 
(0.644) (0.780) (0.939) (0.840) (0.084) (0.134) 
A_CF2TA 878.3411 1069.4154 1709.4976 1745.9748 1077.2761 754.107 
 
(0.523) (0.450) (0.373) (0.370) (0.768) (0.857) 
A_Leverage 425.8312 287.2647 337.4512 460.0418 1159.6331 1002.964 
 
(0.479) (0.601) (0.527) (0.356) (0.612) (0.696) 
RTV -140.3616 -109.0339 22.8028 82.9018 -353.562 -383.5781 
 
(0.312) (0.420) (0.899) (0.657) (0.263) (0.243) 
Public -373.9953*   -387.4860* -423.8477*   -433.5501*   818.5004 788.8397 
 
(0.094) (0.086) (0.096) (0.091) (0.351) (0.339) 
Competing Bid 346.9427 366.3112 268.837 297.5973 -445.2156 -443.6062 
 
(0.409) (0.378) (0.678) (0.646) (0.324) (0.318) 
Stock -131.8723 -149.7471 -90.5398 -124.2258 -742.6887 -712.0016 
 
(0.736) (0.709) (0.835) (0.777) (0.149) (0.157) 
Diversification -294.7627*   -277.6282 -381.4274**  -370.0031**  -101.0069 -76.3104 
 
(0.094) (0.110) (0.038) (0.039) (0.814) (0.850) 
Tender -52.3973 -13.4055 -88.7289 -87.7279 165.4793 149.8434 
 
(0.808) (0.950) (0.746) (0.747) (0.526) (0.580) 
Hostile 87.1296 70.2347 704.2382 710.4905 106.1737 115.7868 
 
(0.865) (0.889) (0.584) (0.580) (0.829) (0.813) 
Market Valuation -216.3533*   -235.9127* -263.6395*   -276.8539*   -480.77 -477.0276 
 
(0.078) (0.058) (0.051) (0.051) (0.495) (0.509) 
Run-up -249.8312 -362.9271 -465.3245 -582.4293 1184.0368 1165.2797 
 
(0.439) (0.261) (0.232) (0.141) (0.116) (0.148) 
Top Advisor 263.8345 256.1461 325.7008 309.6305 -368.4283 -346.3539 
 
(0.305) (0.312) (0.255) (0.271) (0.602) (0.628) 
Constant 996.689 231.7109 111458.0364**  106927.0193*   180008.5638 173626.347 
 
(0.232) (0.715) (0.042) (0.055) (0.105) (0.136) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       N 2,432 2,432 2,090 2,090 342 342 






Table 6 – BHAR analysis 
This table reports the mean and median values of acquirer’s buy and hold abnormal returns over three event windows. 
To eliminate biases related to long-run event study, we employ size-adjusted buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHARs). 
BHAR12, BHAR24 and BHAR36 respectively represent long-run returns for the samples over 12-, 24-, and 36-month 
period following the announcement date. First, we present the values for the full sample. Next, we sub-divide our 
sample based on whether the deal is completed and the level of acquisition experience. The t-test and Wilcoxon test 
are used to test for statistical significance of means and medians, respectively. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Full Sample       
  BHAR12 BHAR24 BHAR36 
Panel A: Successful sample     
 Mean -0.0320*** -0.0708*** -0.0659*** 
Median -0.0419*** -0.0882*** -0.1311*** 
N 2,824 2,824 2,824 
Panel B: Failed sample 
   Mean -0.0750*** -0.1023*** -0.1746*** 
Median -0.0748*** -0.0963*** -0.2212*** 
N 443 443 443 
Diff (B)-(A) 
   Mean -0.0430** -0.0315 -0.1087*** 
Median -0.0329** -0.0081 -0.0901*** 
Low experience        
  BHAR12 BHAR24 BHAR36 
Panel C: Successful sample 
 
    
Mean -0.0407*** -0.0799*** -0.0802*** 
Median -0.0638*** -0.1343*** -0.1954*** 
N 925 925 925 
Panel D: Failed sample 
   Mean -0.1072*** -0.1365*** -0.2226*** 
Median -0.1370*** -0.1831*** -0.3247*** 
N 173 173 173 
Diff (D)-(C) 
   Mean -0.0664* -0.0567 -0.1423** 
Median -0.0732** -0.0488 -0.1293** 
Moderate experience        
  BHAR12 BHAR24 BHAR36 
Panel E: Successful sample 
 
    
Mean -0.0430*** -0.0920*** -0.0984*** 
Median -0.0518*** -0.1078*** -0.1668*** 
N 1,204 1,204 1,204 
Panel F: Failed sample 
   Mean -0.0694** -0.1176*** -0.2245*** 
Median -0.0654** -0.0897* -0.2218*** 
N 178 178 178 
Diff (F)-(E) 
   Mean -0.0264 -0.0256 -0.1261** 
Median -0.0136 0.0181 -0.0550** 
High experience        
  BHAR12 BHAR24 BHAR36 
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Panel G: Successful sample 
 
    
Mean -0.0013 -0.0219 0.0095 
Median 0.0014 -0.0196 -0.0024 
N 695 695 695 
Panel H: Failed sample 
   Mean -0.0253 -0.0082 0.0121 
Median -0.0416 0.0058 -0.0516 
N 92 92 92 
Diff (H)-(G) 
   Mean -0.0240 0.0137 0.0026 
Median -0.0429 0.0254 -0.0491 
The difference between low experience and high experience 
  BHAR12 BHAR24 BHAR36 
Panel I: Successful sample 
   Diff (G)-(C) 
   Mean 0.0394** 0.0580** 0.0897** 
Median 0.0652*** 0.1147*** 0.1930*** 
Panel J: Failed sample 
   Diff (H)-(D) 
   Mean 0.0819 0.1283* 0.2346** 






















Table 7 – Panel data regression of acquirer long-run stock performance 
This table reports panel data regressions of acquirer’s long-run stock performance. BHAR36 is the dependent variable 
in all models, which is acquirer’s buy-and-hold abnormal return from size- and book-to-market ratio-adjusted model 
in the 36-month event window following the mega-deal announcement. Experience is the detrended number of 
acquisition completed before the mega-deal of our interest. High Experience Dummy takes the value of 1 if the mega-
deals is carried by acquirers with a high level of experience, i.e. more than 12 completed acquisitions, and 0 otherwise. 
Models (1) and (2) include the sample of successful mega-deals. Models (3) and (4) examine the sample of failed 
mega-deals. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are shown in the Appendix. 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. We report p-value in parentheses. Significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
BHAR36 Successful Sample Failed Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Experience 0.0071**   0.0095 
 
 
(0.022)  (0.697) 
 High Experience Dummy  0.2165*    0.4557 
 
 (0.069)  (0.164) 
A_LNMV -0.2281*** -0.6053*** -0.4008**  -0.4709*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.003) 
A_M2B -0.0008*   -0.0015 0.0189 0.0228 
 
(0.060) (0.122) (0.201) (0.106) 
A_CF2TA 0.7055*** 2.7498**  -0.8187 -1.1206 
 
(0.002) (0.018) (0.463) (0.304) 
A_Leverage 0.0449 0.0061 -0.3388 -0.576 
 
(0.674) (0.978) (0.715) (0.530) 
RTV -0.0245 -0.155 -0.1096 -0.1107 
 
(0.497) (0.183) (0.484) (0.431) 
Public -0.0281 -0.0819 0.2087 0.1466 
 
(0.296) (0.128) (0.530) (0.644) 
Competing Bid 0.0607 0.1584 -0.3912*   -0.4056**  
 
(0.365) (0.171) (0.067) (0.041) 
Stock -0.0986**  -0.0199* -0.3956 -0.3445 
 
(0.031) (0.079) (0.137) (0.130) 
Diversification -0.0316 -0.1155*   -0.0691 -0.0794 
 
(0.244) (0.077) (0.724) (0.676) 
Tender -0.0795**  -0.1189**  0.3513 0.3157 
 
(0.012) (0.027) (0.213) (0.267) 
Hostile 0.0107 0.0639 -0.4605*** -0.3796**  
 
(0.906) (0.719) (0.008) (0.025) 
Market Valuation -0.0093* -0.0219** 0.0221 0.0362 
 
(0.069) (0.041) (0.823) (0.703) 
Top Advisor 0.0014 -0.0743 0.4854 0.4234 
 
(0.956) (0.254) (0.122) (0.175) 
Constant -34.6609*** -88.2520*** -77.1163*   -87.2871**  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.068) (0.026) 
    
 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2032 2032 313 313 
Adjusted R2 0.135 0.172 0.224 0.258 
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Table 8 – Operating performance analysis 
This table reports acquirer’s median industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) from -3 to +3 years relative to the mega-
deal announcement. ROA is calculated as the ratio of net income to total assets. Industry-adjusted ROA is calculated 
by subtracting the median ROA of the corresponding industry from the firm ROA. The sample is divided based on the 
level of acquisition experience and whether the deal is completed. The Wilcoxon test is used to test for statistical 
significance. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
Industry-adjusted ROA   Firm experience 
 Year relative to merger   Low (1) Moderate (2) High (3) 
Panel A: Successful Sample     
-3 Median 2.22% 4.14% 7.69% 
 
N 680 919 589 
-2 Median 2.73% 4.23% 7.86% 
 
N 680 921 589 
-1 Median 3.35% 4.87% 8.05% 
 
N 679 920 589 
1 Median 2.67% 3.84% 7.82% 
 
N 660 908 586 
2 Median 2.55% 4.06% 7.79% 
 
N 664 835 586 
3 Median 2.79% 3.54% 7.49% 
 
N 664 756 586 
Pre-merger 3 years median 
 
2.97% 4.63% 7.68% 
Post-merger 3 years median 
 
2.81% 4.02% 7.58% 
Difference [-3, +3]   -0.15%** -0.62%** -0.10% 
Panel B: Failed Sample 
    -3 Median 2.29% 3.99% 4.43% 
 
N 142 132 77 
-2 Median 3.43% 3.80% 3.92% 
 
N 142 133 77 
-1 Median 2.89% 3.75% 4.41% 
 
N 142 133 77 
1 Median 3.04% 3.81% 4.75% 
 
N 130 127 76 
2 Median 2.92% 3.00% 5.36% 
 
N 131 119 76 
3 Median 2.34% 3.00% 5.17% 
 
N 131 110 76 
Pre-merger 3 years median 
 
3.44% 3.81% 4.41% 
Post-merger 3 years median 
 
2.81% 2.87% 5.58% 









Table 9 – Panel data regression of acquirer long-run operating performance 
This table reports panel data regressions of acquirer’s long-run operating performance. The changes in industry-
adjusted ROA is the dependent variable in all models, which is the difference between the pre-merger and post-merger 
3-year median industry-adjusted ROA. Experience is the detrended number of acquisition completed before the mega-
deal of our interest. High Experience Dummy takes the value of 1 if the mega-deals is carried by acquirers with a high 
level of experience, i.e. more than 12 completed acquisitions, and 0 otherwise. Models (1) and (2) include the sample 
of successful mega-deals. Models (3) and (4) examine the sample of failed mega-deals. All models include firm and 
year fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are shown in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels. We report p-value in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by 
***, ** and * respectively. 
ΔROA Successful Sample Failed Sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Experience 0.0015**   -0.0039  
 (0.019)  (0.342)  
High Experience 
Dummy  0.0276*    -0.0389 
  (0.073)  (0.200) 
A_LNMV -0.0084*   -0.0081*   -0.0219 -0.0141 
 (0.071) (0.095) (0.205) (0.366) 
A_M2B 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 
 (0.884) (0.957) (0.988) (0.976) 
A_CF2TA -0.2231**  -0.2105**  0.1187 0.1252 
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.249) (0.249) 
A_Leverage 0.0319 0.0343 0.0617 0.0851 
 (0.137) (0.104) (0.475) (0.367) 
RTV -0.0162*** -0.0167*** -0.0044 -0.0034 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.844) (0.838) 
Public -0.0007 -0.0009 0.0097 0.0277 
 (0.913) (0.891) (0.776) (0.333) 
Competing Bid 0.0024 0.0039 0.0319 0.0196 
 (0.776) (0.633) (0.212) (0.202) 
Stock -0.0200** -0.0194* 0.0359 0.0151 
 (0.037) (0.064) (0.195) (0.449) 
Diversification -0.0104*   -0.0107*   0.0148 0.0042 
 (0.075) (0.066) (0.577) (0.848) 
Tender -0.0136*   -0.0130*   -0.0496**  -0.0365* 
 (0.053) (0.062) (0.035) (0.050) 
Hostile -0.0099 -0.0108 -0.0182 -0.032 
 (0.525) (0.489) (0.525) (0.211) 
Top Advisor -0.0041 -0.0036 0.0079 0.0328 
 (0.422) (0.480) (0.882) (0.442) 
Constant 0.2731 0.0241 -5.1663 -1.195 
 (0.783) (0.980) (0.477) (0.814) 
     Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 1909 1909 307 307 
Adjusted R2 0.076 0.079 0.081 0.064 
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Table 10 – IV regression of short-run stock performance 
This table reports 2SLS regression of acquirer’s short-run stock performance. Models (1) and (2) test the relationship 
between Experience and ACAR3. Models (3) and (4) test the relationship between High Experience Dummy and 
ACAR3. The instrumental variables are Urban and Age. Urban is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the acquiring firm 
is headquartered in the 10 largest metropolitan statistical areas on the U.S. government list, and 0 otherwise. Age is 
measured by the duration between the earliest year of the acquirer listed in Compustat and the year of the acquirers 
announcing mega-deals. All models include firm and year fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions are shown in the 
Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. We report p-value in parentheses. 
Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
 Full Sample First-stage regression 
Second-stage 




Experience ACAR3 High Experience Dummy ACAR3 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Predicted Experience  0.0014**  
 
 
 (0.037)  
 Predicted High Experience 
Dummy    0.0167** 
 
   (0.032) 
Instrumental variables:     
Urban 0.9527***  0.0187*  
 
(0.007)  (0.071)  
Age 0.0545***  0.0016***  
 
(0.000)  (0.002)  
A_LNMV 2.5522*** -0.0028 0.1098*** -0.0024 
 
(0.000) (0.651) (0.000) (0.745) 
A_M2B -0.0105** 0 -0.0004 -0.0001 
 
(0.036) (0.446) (0.112) (0.440) 
A_CF2TA 1.561 0.0341** -0.0247 0.0836** 
 
(0.424) (0.016) (0.812) (0.021) 
A_Leverage -0.3904 0.0031 -0.0232 0.0045 
 
(0.499) (0.906) (0.447) (0.561) 
RTV 1.6541*** 0.0024 0.0803*** 0.0017 
 
(0.000) (0.625) (0.000) (0.820) 
Public -0.3236 -0.0201*** 0.0082 -0.0238*** 
 
(0.317) (0.000) (0.632) (0.000) 
Competing Bid -0.1579 -0.0055 -0.0202 -0.0032 
 
(0.792) (0.569) (0.526) (0.683) 
Stock 1.0741** -0.0266*** 0.0324 -0.0360*** 
 
(0.012) (0.001) (0.153) (0.000) 
Diversification 1.5194*** -0.0154*** 0.0359** -0.0155*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.030) (0.001) 
Tender 0.4067 0.0061 0.0081 0.0051 
 
(0.311) (0.279) (0.703) (0.115) 
Hostile 0.2182 0.0033 0.017 -0.0027 
 
(0.739) (0.545) (0.625) (0.751) 
Market Valuation -0.1131 -0.0044 -0.0062 -0.0062**  
 
(0.571) (0.137) (0.553) (0.016) 
Run-up -1.0981*** -0.0021 -0.0293 -0.0069 
 (0.001) (0.628) (0.109) (0.131) 
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Top Advisor -0.3974 -0.0026 -0.0168 -0.0002 
 
(0.230) (0.612) (0.339) (0.965) 
Constant -134.7451*** -0.0978 -4.4890** -0.5063 
 
(0.000) (0.885) (0.014) (0.411) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     N 2028 2028 2028 2028 
Adjusted R2 0.145 0.059 0.193 0.067 
p-value for Wu-Hausman's test 0.0135 
 
0.0308 
 Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 20.72 
 
14.35 



























Table 11 – Threshold regression of short-run stock performance 
This table reports threshold model of acquirer’s short-term performance. ACAR3 is the dependent variable in models 
of Panel A, which is acquirer’s cumulative abnormal return over 3-day event window surrounding the announcement 
date. Experience is the detrended number of acquisition completed before the mega-deal of our interest. Two regimes 
are defined by threshold model: inexperienced acquirer (Experience<=4) and experienced acquirer (Experience>4), of 
which the results are presented in Model (1) and (2), respectively. All models include industry and year fixed effects. 
Detailed variable definitions are shown in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. We report t-statistics in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
ACAR3 Regime1: Experience<=4 Regime 2: Experience>4 
  (1) (2) 
Experience 0.0028 0.0027*** 
 
(0.258) (0.005) 
A_LNMV -0.0049 0.0119 
 
(0.355) (0.253) 
A_M2B 0.0013** 0.0014 
 
(0.018) (0.184) 
A_CF2TA -0.1288 -0.0837 
 
(0.142) (0.233) 
A_Leverage -0.0156 0.0035 
 
(0.541) (0.902) 
RTV 0.0094 -0.0149 
 
(0.367) (0.143) 
Public -0.0063 -0.0211**  
 
(0.488) (0.017) 
Competing Bid 0.0166 0.0024 
 
(0.330) (0.911) 
STOCK -0.0299** -0.0052 
 
(0.036) (0.681) 
Diversification -0.0349*** -0.0152*   
 
(0.000) (0.076) 
Tender 0.0077 0.0153 
 
(0.385) (0.243) 
Hostile -0.0626*** 0.0052 
 
(0.000) (0.846) 
Market Valuation -0.0053 -0.0038 
 
(0.338) (0.398) 
Run-up 0.0192 -0.013 
 
(0.195) (0.266) 
Top Advisor -0.0056 0.0038 
 (0.601) (0.688) 
Constant -0.0713** 4.0528**  
 (0.026) (0.024) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect  Yes Yes 
   N 1074 1358 
R2 0.126 0.035 
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Table 12 – Analyses on completion and short-run stock performance by different time periods 
This table reports linear probability model of mega-deal completion and panel data regressions of acquirer’s short-
term performance over time periods of 1980-2009 and 2010-2016. All models include year and firm fixed effects. 
Detailed variable definitions are shown in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. We report p-value in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** and * 
respectively. 
  Completion ACAR3 
 
1980-2009 2010-2016 1980-2009 2010-2016 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Experience 0.0019** 0.0062*** 0.0017**  0.0029* 
 
(0.045) (0.003) (0.030) (0.065) 
A_LNMV 0.0055 -0.0275**  -0.0024 -0.0035 
 
(0.423) (0.025) (0.624) (0.856) 
A_M2B -0.0008 0 0.0025**  0.001 
 
(0.296) (0.802) (0.046) (0.353) 
A_CF2TA 0.2132* -0.1307 -0.1173*   -0.072 
 
(0.055) (0.565) (0.086) (0.527) 
A_Leverage -0.0463 -0.0136 -0.0087 0.0096 
 
(0.157) (0.774) (0.637) (0.860) 
RTV -0.0396** 0.0034 0.0001 0.0089 
 
(0.031) (0.911) (0.990) (0.654) 
Public -0.1052*** -0.1710*** -0.0223*** -0.0134 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.406) 
Competing Bid -0.2181*** -0.2375**  0.0093 0.0245 
 
(0.000) (0.020) (0.609) (0.375) 
STOCK 0.0056 0.0299 -0.0058 -0.0087 
 
(0.792) (0.607) (0.572) (0.698) 
Diversification -0.0133 0.0392 -0.0185*** -0.0334**  
 
(0.433) (0.110) (0.008) (0.015) 
Tender 0.1189*** 0.2440*** 0.0012 0.0139 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.875) (0.483) 
Hostile -0.4294*** -0.7121*** -0.0031 -0.0402*   
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.891) (0.081) 
Top Advisor 0.0629*** 0.0748*** 0.0076 0.0041 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.401) (0.786) 
Market Valuation   0.003 -0.0169**  
 
  (0.541) (0.016) 
Run-up   -0.0045 -0.0315**  
 
  (0.628) (0.045) 
Constant 0.0059 18.0679 0.0077 -1.4807 
 
(0.879) (0.184) (0.867) (0.915) 
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     N 1738 760 1708 724 




Table 13 – Robustness check for the definition on acquisition experience 
This table reports panel data regressions of the time elapsed between successive deals. TBD is the dependent variable, 
which is the number of days between the most recent completed deal and the announcement date of the current mega-
deal. Short TBD is a TBD below the sample median. Long TBD is a TBD above the sample median. DON is the key 
variable of interest, which is the mega-deal’s sequence for a given acquirer. The model includes year and firm fixed 
effects. Detailed variable definitions are shown in the Appendix. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% 
and 99% levels. We report p-value in parentheses. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels is denoted by ***, ** 
and * respectively. 
TBD Short TBD Long TBD 
  (1) (2) 
DON -1.7675** 12.6924**  
 
(0.039) (0.047) 
Top Advisor -5.675 -13.5741 
 
(0.620) (0.812) 
CEO Expeirence -1.3423 -8.349 
 
(0.073) (0.311) 
Serial Acquirers -0.6751 -47.1301*** 
 
(0.461) (0.000) 
A_LNMV -9.4239 -16.6331 
 
(0.137) (0.466) 





Year fixed effect Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effect Yes Yes 
N 899 1024 


















Table 14 – Robustness check for acquirer’s long-run stock performance 
This table reports calendar time abnormal returns over three event windows. The table presents the equal-weight and 
value-weight analysis results. CTAR12, CTAR24 and CTAR36 respectively represent long-run returns for the samples 
over 12-, 24-, and 36-month period following the announcement date. First, we present the values for the full sample. 
Next, we sub-divide our sample based on the level of acquisition experience. Significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels is denoted by ***, ** and * respectively. 
    Firm Experience 
  Full Sample Low (1) Moderate (2) High (3) 
CTAR12 
    Equal-Weight -1.52%*** -1.65%*** -2.09%*** -0.41% 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.496) 
Value-Weight -1.44%*** -1.63%*** -2%*** -0.25% 
  (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.458) 
CTAR24 
    Equal-Weight -1.31%*** -2.31%*** -1.29%* -0.3% 
 
(0.002) (0.000) (0.085) (0.362) 
Value-Weight -1.06%*** -2.28%*** -0.89%* -0.04% 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.092) (0.305) 
CTAR36 
    Equal-Weight -0.82%** -1.15%** -0.92%** -0.20% 
 
(0.043) (0.024) (0.023) (0.451) 
Value-Weight -0.56%** -1.12%** -0.49%* -0.01% 
  (0.043) (0.011) (0.076) (0.481) 
 
